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# ***Of Territorial Borders and Test Cricket: Exploring the Boundaries of the Postcolonial State***

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## ***Abstract***

This article explores two notably different representations of the border that has divided India and Pakistan since Partition in 1947. I begin by discussing the *Ambala Tribune's* coverage of the 1955 India-Pakistan Test cricket series. During this series, an estimated 20,000 Indians were given permission to attend the Third Test in Lahore – creating what one newspaper described as “the biggest mass migration across the frontier since Partition”. I then examine the role the same border plays in Saadat Hasan Manto’s 1953 story, “Toba Tek Singh”. Here, rather than facilitating non-coercive international movement, the border becomes a repressive mechanism of the state, a *cordon sanitaire* designed to prevent the “warm handshakes and cordial embraces” that would eventually take place in 1955. In this article I attempt to account for the differences between these two narratives and for the fluctuating modalities of the border they describe. I also offer some thoughts on what such differences might tell us about Indo-Pakistani relations more generally, and about the nature of the border separating these postcolonial nation-states.

## ***Keywords***

Partition, Manto, borders, cricket, nation-state, Indo-Pakistani relations

What the map cuts up, the story cuts across.  
(Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, 1974)

## I

At midnight on 14 August 1947 – other dates having been declared inauspicious by the astrologers – after almost a century of direct British rule, India finally achieved Independence. Several days later the Boundary Commission Award was announced, delineating for the first time the exact contours of the two successor states. The departing colonizers had partitioned the subcontinent into three geographical territories: India, essentially as we know it today, and the eastern and western wings of pre-1971 Pakistan. In Delhi, “thousands rejoiced . . . [b]ullocks’ and horses’ legs were painted in the new national colours and silk merchants sold tri-coloured saris”.<sup>1</sup> Yet even as Nehru invoked “the noble mansion of free India where all her children may dwell”<sup>2</sup> and the national flag was raised over the Red Fort, vast swathes of northern India and Pakistan were being engulfed in genocidal violence. In the journalist Shorish Kashmiri’s words:

Conches were blown in India. Drums were beaten in Pakistan. All-India Radio proclaimed Independence by broadcasting *Bande Mataram* and Pakistan Radio did so with a recitation from the Quran. But as day dawned, both sides began to butcher their minorities in the name of religion. . . . In India the Muslims were butchered; in Pakistan the Sikhs and Hindus. Now the riots [of the last eighteen months] had ceased to be communal. On the contrary, the minorities were simply being butchered by the majorities.<sup>3</sup>

During the summer of 1947, an estimated one million people were killed, twelve million displaced and as many as 100,000 women abducted – to be raped and murdered, sold into prostitution, or forced into marriage. These, then, were the immediate consequences of this final act of imperial cartography, the drawing of several perfunctory lines by an ill-informed British lawyer named Cyril Radcliffe. And it is, perhaps, the very cataclysmic nature of this intervention, its epochal impact, that has led the India-Pakistan border to be seen as a kind of transcendent entity – *affecting* historical change but never, or very rarely, subject to it. In other words, the border has been viewed as a spatial or territorial reality, but frequently deprived of its temporality, its specific historical coordinates. It dislocates and divides, it initiates multiple ruptures and discontinuities, and yet for some reason the border itself is figured as static and unchanging, miraculously immune to the very social and historical forces it appears to shape so decisively.

According to Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, the social history of borderlands has been “determined first and foremost by [their] spatial dimension”.<sup>4</sup> This tendency is not difficult to understand, as the border is preeminently a spatial concept, a line employed to demarcate

or define space – in this case, national space. However, it is also important to acknowledge the temporal dimension of territorial borders, their unique “life cycles”,<sup>5</sup> to use Baud and van Schendel’s phrase. And in what follows, I shall be endeavouring to foreground this diachronic quality through the analysis of two contrasting border narratives. I shall begin by discussing the *Ambala Tribune*’s coverage of the 1955 India-Pakistan Test cricket series. During this series, special “cricket visas” were issued by the Pakistani government, enabling a large number of Indian supporters to make their way across the border for the Third Test in Lahore. I shall then explore the role the same border plays in Saadat Hasan Manto’s 1953 story, “Toba Tek Singh”. Here, rather than facilitating non-coercive international movement, it becomes a repressive mechanism of the state, a *cordon sanitaire* designed to prevent the “warm handshakes and cordial embraces”<sup>6</sup> that would eventually take place in 1955. But how does one account for the differences between these two narratives, and for the fluctuating modalities of the border they describe? And what do such differences tell us about Indo-Pakistani relations more generally, and about the nature of the border dividing these postcolonial nation-states?

## II

In January 1955, the Pakistani city of Lahore witnessed what one newspaper described as “the biggest mass migration across the frontier since Partition”.<sup>7</sup> It was the occasion of the Third Test between India and Pakistan, and the usual visa restrictions had been relaxed in an effort to “cement goodwill between the two great countries”.<sup>8</sup> According to the *Ambala Tribune*, over 20,000 Indians were allowed to pass through the Wagah checkpoint in order to attend the cricket. On 28 January alone, their correspondent reports, more than 3,000 people took advantage of the “relaxed passport rules” to cross over into Pakistan, where they were met by “a tremendous rush of Muslims, who had come to the border to receive old friends”. Throughout that first day, “a stream of cars and buses kept running between Amritsar and Attari where arrangements had been made for their speedy clearance”.<sup>9</sup> An even greater number crossed over in special trains which had been scheduled so that “Indians [could] arrive in time to see the first ball being bowled and return home for [the] night”.<sup>10</sup> In Amritsar, the violence and upheaval associated with train journeys during Partition seems to have been forgotten: “Long before the night stars had faded away, 3,000 Amritsar citizens had occupied their seats in the first special train that steamed out of [the] yards at 6.45 a.m. today for Lahore . . . amidst scenes of great excitement.” Almost all of the passengers, we are told, “were visiting Lahore for the first time since the Partition”, and the “Sikh visitors displayed keener

interest because ever since the Partition very few of them had set foot on Pakistan's soil".<sup>11</sup>

Over the next few days, the newspaper reports from Pakistan were dominated by images of communal harmony. "In Lahore itself", the *Tribune's* correspondent writes, "and particularly at the grounds warm handshakes and cordial embraces were long and lingering. . . . Indians were moving about freely in tongas and the double deckers of the Lahore Omnibus Service."<sup>12</sup> And then on 1 February, beneath the headline "Visitors Touched By Hospitality", the same correspondent gave more evidence of this encouraging rapprochement:

Those returning were full of praise for the hospitality of Pakistanis. As soon as they crossed the border, Indian visitors were greeted by waiting Pakistani officials and non-officials, and despite the restrictions indicated on cyclostyled chits affixed to their permits that they could not visit [certain areas], these restrictions in actual practice were not enforced. Several Pakistanis took Indian strangers to their homes and not only served them meals, but made arrangements for their stay. . . . Schools, college buildings, hostels, etc. were all reserved for Indian visitors. Several who did not hold tickets for the match were admitted for free. One Indian officer said that the manner in which Sikhs had been welcomed in Pakistan showed that almost a miracle had happened and there was no trace of hatred, which appeared to be so deep-seated after Partition.<sup>13</sup>

The Indian officer was right; it does seem miraculous that the painful memories of Partition should have given way, only eight years later, to these warm handshakes and cordial embraces. In the light of the subsequent wars between the two countries, the bitterness of the ongoing conflict over Kashmir and the nuclear sparring that has dominated Indo-Pakistani relations since 1998, this moment of cricket-inspired fraternity strikes the reader as almost implausibly utopian. For the duration of the Test, Indian visitors wandered freely through the streets of Lahore, buying rock salt and tangerines to take back across the border. At the ground itself there was "a fair sprinkling of [the] fair sex in colourful saris and dupatas".<sup>14</sup> Parties of Indian schoolgirls even went on sightseeing trips to Lahore's historic Shalimar Gardens. Gone were the memories of mutilated corpses in train carriages, of abject refugees forced from their homes, of abductions and rapes. According to the *Tribune*, the very border that had caused inestimable suffering in 1947 was now facilitating free movement, reuniting old friends, and cementing goodwill between the two countries.<sup>15</sup>

Only two weeks earlier, on the back page of the same newspaper, there had appeared a small item announcing the death of "the well-known dramatist and short-story writer", Saadat Hasan Manto. Manto, who was "equally popular in India and Pakistan", had died of euphemistic

“heart failure” at the age of forty-three – “[leaving] behind 15 collections of short stories and four collections of radio plays and essays”.<sup>16</sup> The film *Ghalib*, for which he had written the screenplay, was still showing in Indian cinemas. As Ramachandra Guha has suggested, it is particularly unfortunate that this “prophet of inter-communal amity” should have been unable to witness the conciliatory scenes that took place in Lahore that year.<sup>17</sup> An inhabitant of the city since 1948, Manto had spoken of wanting to attend the Third Test – and it was one of his “last two wishes” to see the great Hanif Mohammed open for Pakistan at the Bagh-e-Jinnah.<sup>18</sup> But on 18 January 1955, less than a fortnight before the first special train left Amritsar for Lahore, Manto died from cirrhosis of the liver. And so we shall never know what he would have made of this “miracle” of warm handshakes and cordial embraces, of cricket visas and welcoming officials at the Wagah checkpoint.

It was certainly a very different border to the one encountered by Manto’s most famous fictional character, the tragically disorientated Toba Tek Singh. In this eponymous story (first published in Urdu in 1953), the governments of India and Pakistan agree, two or three years after Partition, to exchange the inmates of their respective mental asylums on the basis of religious affiliation. Hindu and Sikh inmates will be sent to India; Muslim inmates will go to Pakistan. This decision naturally causes some consternation among the inmates of the Lahore asylum. One climbs a tree, claiming he would rather live there than in India or Pakistan; another raises the slogan “Pakistan Zindabad” with such gusto that he slips on the bathroom floor and knocks himself unconscious; yet another curses the authorities for having transformed “his beloved into a Hindustani and him into a Pakistani”.<sup>19</sup> What confuses the inmates more than anything, however, is the apparently arbitrary nature of this division. With only “vague notions about why Hindustan had been partitioned and what Pakistan was” (p. 64), they are forced to confront the more artificial and contingent aspects of nation-formation: “If they were in Hindustan, then where was Pakistan? And if they were in Pakistan, then how is it possible that only a short while ago they had been in Hindustan, when they had not moved from the place at all?” (p. 65).

These uncertainties have the greatest impact on an inmate known as Toba Tek Singh, who communicates largely by stringing together unintelligible phrases of his own invention:

He would listen intently whenever there was a discussion in the asylum about Hindustan, Pakistan, and the exchange of lunatics. If anyone asked him about his opinion, he would reply in all seriousness, “Opar di gurgur di annexe di bay dhiana di mung di daal of the government of Pakistan”. (p. 66)

The fact that Toba Tek Singh is known by the same name as his place of origin, a small town in Punjab, immediately foregrounds the role specific territories play in structuring identity. And following Partition, as his sense of being collapses still further into his sense of belonging, the location of Toba Tek Singh, the town, takes on a profound ontological significance for Toba Tek Singh, the man. "He began to ask the other lunatics where Toba Tek Singh, the place he came from, was. But no one knew whether it was in Pakistan or Hindustan" (p. 66).

Eventually the day of the exchange arrives, and the Hindu and Sikh inmates are taken in lorries to the Wagah border crossing. As he is entering India, however, Toba Tek Singh learns that his beloved town now belongs to Pakistan, and this provokes a final, traumatic merger of identities. At this point in the narrative, Manto reconfigures these ontological ambiguities as epistemological or textual ambiguities – so that, like Toba Tek Singh himself, we are unable to distinguish between the man and his place of origin.<sup>20</sup> "Toba Tek Singh is here", he cries, running back into Pakistani territory; but it is not clear which Toba Tek Singh he means. And when the officials try "their best to persuade him that Toba Tek Singh had already gone to Hindustan, or would be sent there immediately" (p. 70), it is similarly impossible to tell whether they are referring to the man or the place. An ontological crisis has thus become one of representation – Toba Tek Singh's hermeneutical delirium leaking into and distorting the text itself. The story draws to a close as a distraught Toba Tek Singh collapses onto his face, halfway between the two countries. "Over there, behind the barbed wires, was Hindustan. Over here, behind identical wires lay Pakistan. In between, on a bit of land with no name, lay Toba Tek Singh" (p. 70).<sup>21</sup>

### III

Of course the border we see in the newspaper accounts of the 1955 Lahore Test and the border we are shown in Manto's 1953 story are topographically one and the same. The Wagah checkpoint can be located on a map; it is twenty-eight kilometres west of Amritsar and fourteen kilometres east of Lahore. And yet in these two narratives the 1955 border and its earlier counterpart operate quite differently. As I have pointed out, the newspaper reports from Lahore describe a border that facilitates non-coercive international movement – enabling people to visit Pakistan "even for a day to meet old friends, to see their properties, and also to establish contacts for business".<sup>22</sup> In "Toba Tek Singh", on the other hand, it becomes a repressive mechanism of the state – a non-contact zone, if you like, designed to enforce difference and preclude all such "free" exchange between the two countries. But how do we

account for these disparities, and what do they tell us about the nature of the border itself?

The India-Pakistan border is, to a large degree, indisputably artificial and arbitrary; and it has been responsible for the disruption of enduring historical, cultural and genealogical affinities on the subcontinent. However, these two narratives suggest that even such notably artificial and “inorganic” borders remain subject to change – their attributes being determined by the various social and political forces converging upon them, from either side, at any given juncture. Or as Baud and van Schendel put it, “The historical development of borderlands [is] determined simultaneously by the situation in two states, and by the social, economic, and political interactions between them. Such interactions vary enormously, and differences can be clearly reflected in the shared borderlands.”<sup>23</sup> In other words, borders are intrinsically dynamic entities, subject to a wide range of historical and political processes, and it would be regrettable to lose sight of this fact by disproportionately emphasizing their imaginary or abstract qualities. Despite the historical rupture Radcliffe’s 1947 border precipitated, it has since followed a distinct temporal trajectory or “life cycle” – demonstrating a considerable degree of functional diversity and mediating a number of forces that are anything but artificial and arbitrary. For this reason, I would like to suggest, it is particularly important to trace the patterns of convergence and divergence that continue to characterize Indo-Pakistani relations, and to register the political intentionality underlying these patterns.

At the time of Partition in 1947 both successor states found it necessary to assert their essential difference from each other, their political and cultural incompatibility – only thus was it possible to justify the divisive logic of the two-nation theory.<sup>24</sup> However, this inaugural moment of divergence should not obscure the contrasting tendencies towards convergence that have also emerged over the last sixty years. Indeed, since 1947, Indo-Pakistani relations have tended to oscillate between these two opposing poles, never entirely settling for either extreme. Needless to say, as Joe Cleary acknowledges,

such developments are always intensely political and keenly contested, and all sorts of factors, domestic and international, condition the trajectories upon which particular states evolve. Neither ultimate divergence nor convergence is predetermined, and the modalities of separation or reintegration vary from one situation to another.<sup>25</sup>

In “Toba Tek Singh”, for example, the border clearly facilitates nationalist ideologies of divergence. During the Partition years, as part of a larger separatist project, multiple layers of historical and cultural sedimentation were deliberately stripped away – leaving only a core religious identity



that came to be considered the quintessential determinant of community. Any affiliation failing to conform to this reductive understanding of identity was deemed illegitimate and subject to systematic erasure. Consequently, according to an intelligence report compiled at the time of the Indian general elections of 1945-46, "Punjabis ceased to be Punjabis and became Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs".<sup>26</sup> In Manto's story, Toba Tek Singh undergoes the same kind of interpellatory process. The fact that he has been categorized as a Sikh, who therefore "belongs" to India, necessitates the erasure of all other "competing" loyalties. His sense of himself, so deeply rooted in a particular topography, comes into direct conflict with a reterritorialized national imaginary. Suddenly he is told that he no longer belongs here, but there; and yet he is incapable of detaching himself from his place of origin. This is a brand of nationalism structured around dichotomous and mutually exclusive identities – one that renders, in Sankaran Krishna's words, "alternative ideas of the self ... spurious, reactionary, and vestigial". Through its "disciplining of ambiguity and its intolerance for multiple or layered notions of identity", citizenship in Manto's story becomes "invariably a matter of either-or".<sup>27</sup> And as it is the border itself that is used to reify these dichotomies, it is particularly appropriate that Toba Tek Singh should collapse there, in the liminal space that separates the nation from its other. Neither Indian nor Pakistani, neither inside nor outside, he becomes a non-person inhabiting a site drained of national signification – "a bit of land with no name" (p. 70), or what has been referred to in another context as "space degree-zero ... the antithesis of national space".<sup>28</sup>

During the 1955 Lahore Test, by contrast, the border was used to endorse a subcontinental identity predating the inauguration of the post-colonial nation-state. Rather than asserting the essential incompatibility of the two communities, rather than validating the logic of the two-nation theory, the border served as a mechanism of reconvergence – reviving old affinities and reversing the process of detachment described above. Franco Moretti has argued that the border traditionally functions in the novel as "the site of *adventure*, one crosses the line, and is face to face with the unknown, often the enemy; the story enters a space of danger, surprises, suspense".<sup>29</sup> And yet the *Tribune's* reportage describes something quite different. Here we witness an unexpected encounter with the familiar, with the self that resides across the border – a place offering not danger and suspense, but likeness, *déjà vu*, and the reassuring banality of rock salt and tangerines.

In his discussion of the work of Faiz Ahmed Faiz, Aamir Mufti has noted that "[t]he lyric subject in [his] poetry is located at those borderlands of self and world where autonomy and heteronomy lose their distinctness, where the self is confronted with the uncanny presence of an

other that is also self".<sup>30</sup> The same confrontation appears to have taken place in Lahore in 1955, and the key word here is "uncanny" – for this kind of doubling, this conjunction of the familiar and the unfamiliar, similitude and difference, is typically associated with the uncanny experience. It was Freud, of course, who suggested that the "uncanny element is actually nothing new or strange, but something that was long familiar to the psyche and was estranged from it only through being repressed".<sup>31</sup> For Freud, in other words, the process that gives rise to the uncanny can be divided into two distinct phases: the repression of "something familiar",<sup>32</sup> and its subsequent return or reemergence. I would like to propose that each of the narratives we have been discussing belongs to one of these phases. In Manto's story we observe the deliberate repression of "long familiar" cultural and historical affinities, while in the scenes recorded in the *Tribune* we are privy to the return of the repressed – as similitude uncannily emerges out of difference, selfhood out of otherness, the homely out of the unhomely. And thus, for the duration of the Third Test, a journey into foreign territory was to become an uncanny experience of homecoming for 20,000 Indian cricket supporters. In an interview with a Pakistani newspaper, one of these supporters said that he felt "as if I have returned to my old home. Lahore has not changed much. Nobody here asks you whether you are a Hindu or a Muslim, or Indian or a Pakistani . . . It is so different from what many fanatics in East Punjab want us to imagine."<sup>33</sup>

As I have suggested, however, it is also important to register the political intentionality underlying these patterns of convergence and divergence – and I would like to conclude with an example of such intentionality. Although the case of the Third Test in Lahore provides heartening evidence of mutual respect and solidarity between ordinary Indians and Pakistanis, there may well have been political motives governing the temporary relaxation of border restrictions. On 28 January 1955, Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, the Pakistani High Commissioner to India, told the *Tribune* that "such a friendly atmosphere was necessary for settling the big problems pending between the two countries" and that he hoped "these problems would be solved by peaceful direct negotiations".<sup>34</sup> He was, one assumes, referring to the issue of Kashmir, and to the so-called "peace offensive" by which Pakistan hoped to resolve this dispute in its favour.<sup>35</sup> The euphoria surrounding the occasion's "warm handshakes and cordial embraces" should therefore be seen in the context of these political exigencies. "The whole experiment has worked very smoothly and successfully from every point of view", the Visa Officer at the Pakistani High Commission in Delhi announced, before going on to confirm that "there would be no extension in the present multi-journey visas issued for the Test Cricket Match which were valid

only up to February 2”, and to contradict “all rumours current in Lahore and Amritsar that visas were being extended up to February 6”.<sup>36</sup> Clearly, once certain political objectives had been achieved, there was no need to prolong the “experiment”. Having served its conciliatory purpose, having opened up these tantalizing utopian vistas, the border could now return to its more familiar nationalist or divergent mode. After six full days, the “miracle” demonstrating that “there was no trace of hatred” between the two countries was finally over.

### NOTES

- 1 D.F. Karaka, cited in Tai Yong Tan and Gyanesh Kudaisya, *The Aftermath of Partition in South Asia*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 56.
- 2 Jawaharlal Nehru, “Tryst with Destiny”, *The Vintage Book of Indian Writing, 1947–1997*, ed. Salman Rushdie and Elizabeth West, London: Vintage, 1997, p. 2.
- 3 Shorish Kashmiri, “Humiliated and Harassed They Left”, *India Partitioned: The Other Face of Freedom*, Vol. II, ed. Mushirul Hasan, Delhi: Roli Books, 1997, p. 146.
- 4 Michiel Baud and Willem van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands”, *Journal of World History* 8, 2 (1997), 221.
- 5 *ibid.*, 223.
- 6 *The Tribune*, 30 January 1955, p. 6.
- 7 *Dawn* (Karachi) cited in Ramachandra Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field: The Indian History of a British Sport*, London: Picador, 2002, p. 384.
- 8 *ibid.*, p. 386.
- 9 *The Tribune*, 30 January 1955, p. 6.
- 10 *ibid.*, 29 January 1955, p. 6.
- 11 *ibid.*, 30 January 1955, p. 6.
- 12 *ibid.*
- 13 *ibid.*, 1 February 1955, p. 6.
- 14 *ibid.*, 31 January 1955, p. 10.
- 15 In recent years, similar scenes have taken place on both sides of the border. Indian supporters travelling to Pakistan for the 2004 cricket series between the two countries were offered “simplified travel formalities” – and once more the tour was predicted to “strengthen the bond of friendship between [the] two nations” (*The Guardian*, 16 February 2004, p. 26). “Pakistan is to relax visa regulations for Indian nationals”, Vivek Chaudhary reported in February of that year, “as an estimated 10,000 fans are expected to visit the country for the forthcoming cricket tour between the two countries” (*The Guardian*, 21 February 2004, p. 3). According to Rahul Bhattacharya, at least 2,000 Indians “crossed the border by air, road and foot” to attend the fourth one-day international in Lahore. “They took advantage of the relaxation in visa requirements and came not only to take in the floodlit spectacle but to locate their ancestral homes or the birthplace of their parents – or out of desperate curiosity about a land that has been almost forbidden to them” (*The Guardian*, 22 March 2004, p. 14). And during the 2005 Pakistani tour of India this hospitality was reciprocated: “It is happening all over again, with Indians desperate to prove that they can be as welcoming as hosts as Pakistan were last time around. Most of the 4,000 Pakistani

fans descending on Mohali for [the First] Test will not be staying in hotels – they will be staying in the homes of Indian families for free. Hundreds of families have responded to a request for volunteers to host the Pakistani fans, and they are not getting a penny for it” (*The Independent*, 8 March 2005, p. 46).

- 16 *The Tribune*, 20 January 1955, p. 14.
- 17 Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field*, p. 384.
- 18 Hamid Jalal, “Uncle Manto”, *Black Milk: A Collection of Short Stories*, by Saadat Hasan Manto, trans. Hamid Jalal, Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1997, p. 33.
- 19 Saadat Hasan Manto, “Toba Tek Singh”, trans. Mohammad Asaduddin, *Translating Partition*, ed. Ravikant and Tarun K. Saint, Delhi: Katha, 2001, p. 66. Subsequent references are to this edition and will be cited in the text.
- 20 In a note to his translation of the story, Mohammad Asaduddin describes the “brilliant metonymic process” by which Toba Tek Singh “becomes the place where he was born”, and makes it clear that he has deliberately retained “this tension and ambiguity . . . even if it meant sacrificing a bit of lucidity” (*ibid.*, p. 71).
- 21 Although “Toba Tek Singh” would seem almost fantastical in its absurdity, there is in fact a real-life precedent for the story. In a January 1949 issue of *The Statesman* (Calcutta), the following article appeared under the headline “Exchange of Mental Patients”: “An agreement has been reached . . . between the Dominions of India and Pakistan under which non-Muslim patients in the mental hospitals in Pakistan will be exchanged with Muslim patients in similar hospitals in India, provided that the relatives of [the] patients concerned have migrated from one Dominion to the other and subject to the adjustment of any amounts that might be due on their accounts. This agreement applies only to those mental patients whose names are borne on the registers of these hospitals as on December 1, 1948” (29 January 1949, p. 1).
- 22 *The Tribune*, 1 February 1955, p. 6.
- 23 Baud and van Schendel, “Toward a Comparative History of Borderlands”, 219.
- 24 This term refers to the conviction, widely held during the 1940s, that “[t]he Hindus and the Muslims . . . belong to two different civilizations which are based mainly on conflicting ideas and conceptions”, and that to “yoke together two such nations under a single State, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and the final destruction of any fabric that may be so built up for the government of such a State” (Mohammed Ali Jinnah, “An Extract from the Presidential Address of M.A. Jinnah – Lahore, March 1940”, *India’s Partition: Process, Strategy and Mobilization*, ed. Mushirul Hasan, Delhi: OUP, 2001, p. 56).
- 25 Joe Cleary, *Literature, Partition and the Nation-State: Culture and Conflict in Ireland, Israel and Palestine*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002, p. 59.
- 26 Cited in Gyanendra Pandey, *Remembering Partition: Violence, Nationalism and History in India*, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001, p. 198.
- 27 Sankaran Krishna, “Cartographic Anxiety: Mapping the Body Politic in India”, *Political Geography: A Reader*, ed. John Agnew, London: Arnold, 1997, p. 82.
- 28 Cleary, *Literature, Partition and the Nation-State*, p. 221.
- 29 Franco Moretti, *Atlas of the European Novel, 1800–1900*, London: Verso, 1998, p. 35.
- 30 Aamir R. Mufti, *Enlightenment in the Colony: The Jewish Question and the Crisis of Postcolonial Culture*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2007, pp. 223–4.

- 31 Sigmund Freud, "The Uncanny" (1919), *The Uncanny*, trans. David McLintock, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2003, p. 148. Significantly, Freud also identifies "the idea of the 'double'" (p. 141) as a source of the uncanny, for "a person may identify himself with another and so become unsure of his true self; or he may substitute the other's self for his own" (p. 142).
- 32 *ibid.*, p. 152.
- 33 Cited in Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field*, p. 385.
- 34 *The Tribune*, 30 January 1955, p. 6.
- 35 Speaking in London several days after the conclusion of the Third Test, the Pakistani Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra commented that "it must be a matter of the utmost concern to the conscience of the free world that after seven long years the four million inhabitants of Kashmir should still [be] denied the right of self-determination" (cited in Guha, *A Corner of a Foreign Field*, p. 386).
- 36 *The Tribune*, 2 February 1955, p. 6.